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Abstract
The ongoing Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic threatens the
health of humans and causes great economic losses. Predictive modelling
and forecasting the epidemic trends are essential for developing counter-
measures to mitigate this pandemic. We develop a network model, where
each node represents an individual and the edges represent contacts between
individuals where the infection can spread. The individuals are classified
based on the number of contacts they have each day (their node degrees)
and their infection status. The transmission network model was respectively
fitted to the reported data for the COVID-19 epidemic in Wuhan (China),
Toronto (Canada), and the Italian Republic using a Markov Chain Monte
Carlo (MCMC) optimization algorithm. Our model fits all three regions well
with narrow confidence intervals and could be adapted to simulate other
megacities or regions. The model projections on the role of containment
strategies can help inform public health authorities to plan control measures.
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1. Introduction
The development of international trade and tourism has accelerated the
spatial spread of infectious diseases. The limited data available on emerg-
ing epidemics adds to the challenge of mitigating the spread of emerging
infections [1]. The unprecedented Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19)
outbreak began at the end of 2019. The number of reported cases keeps
rising worldwide and thousands of lives have been claimed. This pandemic
is having an enormous impact on world health, disturbing the stability of
the societies, and triggers great economic losses. Predicting the future of the
pandemic, assessing the impacts of current interventions, and evaluating the
effectiveness of alternate mitigation strategies are of utmost importance for
saving lives.
Mathematical models can be used to understand the dynamics of epi-
demics and help inform control strategies. A numerous number of models
are being used to project the current COVID-19 pandemic. Ziff and Ziff an-
alyzed the number of reported cases for Wuhan (China) and showed that the
growth of the daily number of confirmed new cases indicates an underlying
fractal or small-world network of connections between susceptible and in-
fected individuals [2]. Wang et al. developed an SEIR model to estimate the
epidemic trends in Wuhan, assuming the prevention and control measures
were either sufficient or insufficient to control the epidemic [3]. Kucharski et
al. combined a stochastic transmission model with data on cases of COVID-
19 in Wuhan and international cases to estimate how the transmission had
varied over time between January and February in 2020 [4].
Kraemer et al. analyzed the impact of interventions on the spread of
COVID-19 in China using transportation data [5]. Chinazzi et al. used a
global meta-population disease transmission model to project the impact of
travel limitations on the national and international spread of the epidemic.
They showed that the travel restriction of Wuhan, China had a more marked
effect on the international scale than that on Mainland China [6].
Ferguson et al. found that optimal mitigation policies (combining home
isolation of suspected cases, home quarantine of those living in the same
household as suspected cases, and social distancing of the elderly and others
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at most risk of severe disease) might reduce peak healthcare demand by 2/3
and deaths by half [7]. Likewise, Hellewell et al. developed a stochastic
transmission model and found that highly effective contact tracing and case
isolation is enough to control a new outbreak of COVID-19 within three
months in most scenarios [8].
Zhang et al. fitted the reported serial interval (mean and standard devia-
tion) with a gamma distribution to estimate the basic reproduction number
at the early stage of a COVID-19 outbreak, indicating the potential of second
outbreaks [9]. Maier et al. developed a compartmental model dividing indi-
viduals into susceptible, exposed, removed, and quarantined symptomatically
infected and showed that the distinctive subexponential increase of confirmed
cases in mainland China could be explained as a direct consequence of con-
tainment policies that effectively deplete the susceptible population [10].
Most of these models are based on assuming the population is homoge-
neously mixing, that is, the contacts between people are random and uni-
formly distributed throughout the population. However, different individuals
may have varying numbers of acquaintances and contacts in the real world.
The important role that heterogenous contact networks play in the trans-
mission dynamics of infectious diseases is often overlooked [11]. Models that
take into account contact heterogeneity better represent the actual transmis-
sion network through a population and are more likely to capture the true
epidemic dynamics.
Disease propagation is closely linked with the structure of social contact
networks [12]. The ubiquitous diversity in contact patterns and heterogene-
ity among individuals depends on differences in social structures, spatial
distances, and behavior [13]. The heterogeneity exists at a wide range of
scales and leads to highly variable transmission dynamics of infectious dis-
eases [14, 15].
Many real-world social networks can be characterized by a randomWatts-
Strogatz (WS) small-world network [16, 17]. In a small-world network, most
nodes can be reached from every other node by a small number of hops or
steps, even if they are not immediate neighbours. This type of network model
allows us to adapt changes to some realistic network structures and examine
the effects of control and intervention countermeasures such as social dis-
tancing, self-isolation, and personal protection. The framework and analysis
can be applied to study the transmission dynamics in different regions and
many other infectious diseases.
The COVID-19 epidemic in Wuhan ended in April, while the epidemics
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in the Greater Toronto Area (GTA, Canada) and the Italian Republic are
continuing to grow. We fit the parameters of our network model to the
confirmed cases in each of these regions. Although Wuhan, Toronto, and
Italy differ in some ways, the way that SARS-CoV-2 is transmitted from
one person to another is quite similar. Individuals may acquire infection
from other infectious individuals, even if they do not contact each other
directly. The Watts-Strogatz model supplies an ideal tool to study the spread
of epidemics among individuals even if their locations are not considered. We
used the Watts-Strogatz model to generate random networks with the small
world properties appropriate for infectious disease transmission in these cities
[16, 17].
The epidemic curves are all fitted very well using the small-world network
structure models, indicating that the typical small-world property is able to
capture the contact patterns during COVID-19 epidemics. The differences
in these fitted parameters and starting times reflect the differences in the
underlying transmission mechanisms and potential spread in the regions.
The model then projected the trends of COVID-19 spread by simulating
epidemics in the Wuhan, Toronto, and Italy networks. Our findings can
guide public health authorities to implement effective mitigation strategies
and be prepared for potential future outbreaks.
2. The network model
We develop a network-based model by extending the network SIR model
[18] by incorporating the characteristics of COVID-19 transmission to assess
the spread of the disease in heterogeneous populations. We derive the explicit
expression of the epidemic threshold and discuss the final epidemic size for
the network model.
2.1. Model formulation
We classify individuals by their average number of contacts in a typi-
cal day (time unit for the modeling) represented on the network by their
degree k (k = 1, 2, · · · , n). Individuals with degree k are divided into suscep-
tible (Sk), exposed (Ek), asymptomatically infected (Ak), symptomatically
infected (Ik), hospitalized (Hk), recovered (Rk), and dead (Dk) states. Our
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model is formulated as follows

dsk
dt
= −βksk
∑
k′[1− (1−
k′−1
k′
P (k′|k)ik′)(1−
k′−1
k′
P (k′|k)σak′)],
dek
dt
= βksk
∑
k′[1− (1−
k′−1
k′
P (k′|k)ik′)(1−
k′−1
k′
P (k′|k)σak′)]− ǫek,
dak
dt
= (1− δ)ǫek − γaak,
dik
dt
= δǫek − γik − µik − ξik,
dhk
dt
= ξik − γhhk − µhk,
drk
dt
= γik + γaak + γhhk,
ddk
dt
= µik + µhk,
(2.1)
where sk = Sk/Nk, ek = Ek/Nk, ak = Ak/Nk, ik = Ik/Nk, hk = Hk/Nk,
rk = Rk/Nk, and dk = Dk/Nk represent the fractions of susceptible, ex-
posed, asymptomatically infected, symptomatically infected, hospitalized,
recovered, and dead individuals with degree k, respectively. Here, Nk is
the total number of individuals with degree k, and Nk = Sk +Ek +Ak + Ik
+Hk +Rk +Dk, and sk +ek +ak + ik +hk + rk +dk = 1. P (k
′|k) represents
the probability that an edge from a node with degree k connects to a node
with degree k′. For uncorrelated networks, P (k′|k) = k′P (k′)/〈k〉 [19]. Since
the node with degree k′ shares an edge with the node degree k, and only has
(k′ − 1) free edges, a fraction k
′−1
k′
of nodes may acquire the infection.
We assume that the transmission rates of symptomatically infected in-
dividuals and asymptomatically infected individuals are β and σβ, respec-
tively. The factor σ accounts for the different transmission rates between
asymptomatically infected individuals and symptomatically infected individ-
uals. βksk
∑
k′
k′−1
k′
P (k′|k)ik′ represents the fraction of nodes with degree
k infected by symptomatically infected nodes, and σβksk
∑
k′
k′−1
k′
P (k′|k)ak′
= βksk
∑
k′
k′−1
k′
P (k′|k)σak′ represents the fraction of nodes with degree k
infected by asymptomatically infected nodes. Here, k
′−1
k′
P (k′|k)ik′ represents
the probability that an edge from a degree k node connects to a symptomat-
ically infected node with degree k′, and k
′−1
k′
P (k′|k)σak′ represents the prob-
ability that an edge from a degree k node connects to an asymptomatically
infected node with degree k′.
In Model (2.1), the term (1− k
′−1
k′
P (k′|k)ik′) represents the probability of
not being infected by a symptomatically infected node with degree k′, and
(1 − k
′−1
k′
P (k′|k)σak′) represents the probability of not being infected by an
asymptomatically infected node with degree k′. Thus, (1− k
′−1
k′
P (k′|k)ik′)(1−
k′−1
k′
P (k′|k)σak′) is the probability that a node will neither be infected by a
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symptomatically infected nor be infected by an asymptomatically infected
neighbor with degree k′, and 1− (1− k
′−1
k′
P (k′|k)ik′)(1−
k′−1
k′
P (k′|k)σak′) is
the probability of being infected by a symptomatically infected or an asymp-
tomatically infected neighbor with degree k′.
Therefore, the susceptible individuals are infected at rate
βksk
∑
k′
[1− (1−
k′ − 1
k′
P (k′|k)ik′)(1−
k′ − 1
k′
P (k′|k)σak′)]
and enter the exposed state. After incubation period with a mean time of
1/ǫ days, exposed individuals become symptomatically infected and asymp-
tomatically infected with probabilities δ and 1−δ, respectively. Symptomati-
cally infected individuals are hospitalized at rate ξ, and die at rate µ. Asymp-
tomatically infected individuals, symptomatically infected individuals, and
hospitalized individuals recover at rates γa, γ, and γh, respectively. Both the
hospitalized individuals and symptomatically infected individuals die at rate
µ.
2.2. Mathematical analysis
We derive the epidemic threshold to predict whether the epidemic will
spread or die out and derive final epidemic size to quantify the total number
of infected individuals.
2.2.1. The epidemic threshold
To estimate the transmission potential of the epidemic, we derive the im-
portant epidemic threshold, R0, defined as the average number of secondary
cases produced by an infected individual in a completely susceptible popula-
tion [20]. There exists a disease-free equilibrium,
(s1, · · · , sn, e1, · · · , en, a1, · · · , an, i1, · · · , in, h1, · · · , hn, r1, · · · , rn, d1, · · · , dn)
T
= (1, · · · , 1, 0, · · · , 0, 0, · · · , 0, 0, · · · , 0, 0, · · · , 0, 0, · · · , 0, 0, · · · , 0)T =: E0.
We compute R0 following the next generation matrix approach presented
by van den Driessche and Watmough [21]. For simplicity, we only consider
the compartments related to infection, namely, ek, ak and ik, and rewrite the
equations as the difference between vectors Fk and Vk following the notations
in [21]
[
dek
dt
,
dak
dt
,
dik
dt
]T = Fk − Vk,
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where
Fk = (Fik) =

 βksk
∑
k′[1− (1−
k′−1
k′
P (k′|k)ik′)(1−
k′−1
k′
P (k′|k)σak′)]
0
0

 ,
Vk = (Vik) =

 ǫek−(1− δ)ǫek + γaak
−δǫek + γik + µik + ξik

 .
Here, Fik represents the rate at which new infections are produced and Vik
represents the rate at which individuals transfer between compartments, i =
1, 2, 3 and k = 1, · · · , n for Model (2.1).
The Jacobian matrix F is
F =
[
∂Fik
∂zj
]
E0
=

 0n×n σβF ′ βF ′0n×n 0n×n 0n×n
0n×n 0n×n 0n×n

 ,
where z = (zj) = (e1, · · · , en, a1, · · · , an, i1, · · · , in) and
F ′ =


0 1
2
P (2|1) · · · n−1
n
P (n|1)
0 P (2|2) · · · 2(n−1)
n
P (n|2)
...
...
...
...
0 n
2
P (2|n) · · · (n− 1)P (n|n)


=
1
〈k〉


0 P (2) · · · (n− 1)P (n)
0 2P (2) · · · 2(n− 1)P (n)
...
...
...
...
0 nP (2) · · · n(n− 1)P (n)

 .
The matrices V and V −1 are
V =
[
∂Vi
∂zj
]
E0
=

 ǫIn 0n×n 0n×n−(1 − δ)ǫIn γaIn 0n×n
−δǫIn 0n×n (γ + µ+ ξ)In

 ,
where In is the n× n identity matrix, and
V −1 =


1
ǫ
In 0n×n 0n×n
1−δ
γa
In
1
γa
In 0n×n
δ
γ+µ+ξ
In 0n×n
1
γ+µ+ξ
In

 .
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The next generation matrix is
FV −1 =

 β
(
1−δ
γa
σ + δ
γ+µ+ξ
)
F ′ σβ
γa
F ′ β
γ+µ+ξ
F ′
0n×n 0n×n 0n×n
0n×n 0n×n 0n×n

 . (2.2)
Since the rank of matrix F ′ is 1, the spectral radius of F ′ is its trace, i.e.,
ρ(F ′) = Tr(F ′) =
1
〈k〉
∑
k
(k − 1)kP (k) =
〈k2〉 − 〈k〉
〈k〉
.
It follows from (2.2) that the basic reproduction number R0 becomes
R0 = ρ(FV
−1) = β
(
1− δ
γa
σ +
δ
γ + µ+ ξ
)
(〈k2〉 − 〈k〉)
〈k〉
,
where β 1−δ
γa
σ and β δ
γ+µ+ξ
represent the average numbers of secondary cases
produced by an asymptomatically infected individual and a symptomatically
infected individual in a homogeneously mixed population, respectively. The
term 〈k
2〉−〈k〉
〈k〉
represents the average excess degree of nodes in the network
[22].
2.2.2. Final epidemic size
We shall derive the final size following the approach in [23]. The nonlinear
term in the first and second equations of Model (2.1) can be rewritten as
βksk
∑
k′
[1− (1−
k′ − 1
k′
P (k′|k)ik′)(1−
k′ − 1
k′
P (k′|k)σak′)]
= βksk
∑
k′
[1− 1 +
k′ − 1
k′
P (k′|k)ik′ +
k′ − 1
k′
P (k′|k)σak′ − (
k′ − 1
k′
P (k′|k))2ik′σak′ ]
= βksk
∑
k′
[
k′ − 1
k′
P (k′|k)ik′ +
k′ − 1
k′
P (k′|k)σak′ − (
k′ − 1
k′
P (k′|k))2ik′σak′].
When ik′ ≪ 1 and ak′ ≪ 1, ik′ak′ ≈ 0. Hence,
βksk
∑
k′
[1− (1−
k′ − 1
k′
P (k′|k)ik′)(1−
k′ − 1
k′
P (k′|k)σak′)]
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≈ βksk
∑
k′
[
k′ − 1
k′
P (k′|k)(ik′ + σak′)].
Hence, Model (2.1) can be simplified as

dsk
dt
= −βksk
∑
k′
k′−1
k′
P (k′|k) (ik′ + σak′) .
dek
dt
= βksk
∑
k′
k′−1
k′
P (k′|k) (ik′ + σak′)− ǫek,
dak
dt
= (1− δ)ǫek − γaak,
dik
dt
= δǫek − γik − µik − ξik,
dhk
dt
= ξik − γhhk − µhk,
drk
dt
= γik + γaak + γhhk,
ddk
dt
= µik + µhk.
(2.3)
We first claim that limt→+∞ ek(t) = 0. Otherwise, there exist T, η > 0
such that ek(t) ≥ η > 0, ∀t > T since ek(t) ≥ 0. Since
d
dt
(sk + ek) = −ǫek ≤
−ǫη, sk(t) + ek(t) ≤ −ǫηt+ s(T ) + e(T ). Therefore, limt→∞(sk(t) + ek(t)) =
−∞, leading to a contradiction. Similarly, we can show that
lim
t→+∞
ek(t) = lim
t→+∞
ak(t) = lim
t→+∞
ik(t) = lim
t→+∞
hk(t) = 0, ∀k.
For a homogeneous network where all nodes have identical degree k,
Model (2.3) can be reduced to the following model

ds
dt
= −βks〈k−1
k
〉 (i+ σa) ,
de
dt
= βks〈k−1
k
〉 (i+ σa)− ǫe,
da
dt
= (1− δ)ǫe− γaa,
di
dt
= δǫe− (γ + µ+ ξ) i,
dh
dt
= ξi− γhh− µh,
dr
dt
= γi+ γaa+ γhh,
dd
dt
= µi+ µh,
(2.4)
with the initial values s(0) = s0, e(0) = e0, a(0) = a0, i(0) = i0, h(0) = h0,
r(0) = 0 and d(0) = 0.
By Model (2.4) and a direct calculation, we have
− (i+ σa) =
1
γ + µ+ ξ
(
ds
dt
+
de
dt
+
da
dt
+
di
dt
)
+
(
σ
γa
−
1
γ + µ+ ξ
)(
(1− δ)
(
ds
dt
+
de
dt
)
+
da
dt
)
.
(2.5)
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By the first equation in Model (2.4), we further have
ln
s(+∞)
s0
= −βk〈
k − 1
k
〉
∫ +∞
0
(i+ σa) dt, (2.6)
where s(+∞) = limt→∞ s(t). To determine the final size of susceptible indi-
viduals, s(+∞), we set
f(x) = s0 exp
{
βk〈
k − 1
k
〉
[
x− y0 − a0 − i0
γ + µ+ ξ
+
(
σ
γa
−
1
γ + µ+ ξ
)
((1− δ) (x− y0)− a0)
]}
,
where y0 = s0 + e0. By (2.5), (2.6) and the definition of f(x), we have
s(+∞) = f(s(+∞)).
It is clear that f(x) is a positive, increasing, strictly convex function, and
f(s0) < s0. Thus, f has a unique fixed point s
+ in the interval (0, s0), which
can be calculated numerically by using the iteration method and
s+ = lim
m→+∞
fm(s0),
where fm denotes composition of f for m times. Then, the final size of sus-
ceptible individuals for a homogeneous network, s(+∞), can be determined
by s+.
We now derive the final size for heterogeneous networks. Integrating the
first equation in Model (2.3) from 0 to t, we have
ln
sk(t)
sk(0)
= −βk
∑
k′
k′ − 1
k′
P (k′|k)
∫ t
0
(ik′ + σak′) du. (2.7)
By summing and integrating the equations in Model (2.3),∫ t
0
ikdu = −
δ
γ + µ+ ξ
(yk(t)− yk(0))−
ik(t)− ik(0)
γ + µ+ ξ
, (2.8)
and ∫ t
0
akdu = −
1− δ
γa
(yk(t)− yk(0))−
1
γa
(ak(t)− ak(0)) , (2.9)
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where yk(t) = sk(t) + ek(t). We set
gk(t) =
(
δ
γ + µ+ ξ
+ σ
1− δ
γa
)
yk(t) +
σ
γa
ak(t) +
ik(t)
γ + µ+ ξ
.
By Equations (2.7),(2.8) and (2.9), we have
ln
sk(+∞)
sk(0)
= βk
n∑
j=1
j − 1
j
P (j|k) (gj(+∞)− gj(0))
= βk
n∑
j=1
j − 1
j
P (j|k)
((
δ
γ + µ+ ξ
+ σ
1− δ
γa
)
sj(+∞)− gj(0)
)
,
where gk(0) ≥ 0, ∀k. Therefore, for all k = 1, ..., n, the final size of susceptible
individuals satisfies
sk(+∞) = sk(0) exp
{
βk
n∑
j=1
j − 1
j
P (j|k)·
·
(
(
δ
γ + µ+ ξ
+ σ
1− δ
γa
) (sj(+∞)− sj(0))− wj(0)
)}
,
where
wk(0) =
(
δ
γ + µ+ ξ
+ σ
1− δ
γa
)
ek(0) +
σ
γa
ak(0) +
ik(0)
γ + µ+ ξ
≥ 0.
We define a map G : Rn → Rn, x = (xj) 7→ G(x) = (G1(x), ..., Gn(x))
T
by
Gi(x) = si(0) exp
{
βi
n∑
j=1
j − 1
j
P (j|i)·
·
(
(
δ
γ + µ+ ξ
+ σ
1− δ
γa
)(xj − sj(0))− wj(0)
)}
.
To analyze the properties of G(x), we shall introduce some notations. For
Y = (Y1, . . . , Yn)
T , Z = (Z1, . . . , Zn)
T ∈ Rn, we denote
Y ≤ Z (resp. Y ≪ Z) if Yl ≤ Zl (resp. Yl < Zl), ∀l = 1, . . . , n. (2.10)
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Moreover, we shall claim Y < Z if Y ≤ Z and Y 6= Z. The above
definition defines a partial order in Rn. For later use, we could extend this
partial order to n× n matrices as follows. For any n × n matrices A,B, we
have
A ≤ B if Ax ≤ Bx, ∀0 ≤ x ∈ Rn.
When 0≪ s(0) = [s1(0), . . . , sn(0)]
T and 0 ≤ w(0) = [w1(0), . . . , wn(0)]
T ,
by the definition of G(x) and partial order defined in (2.10), we have
0≪ G(0) ≤ G(s(0)) ≤ s(0),
Since each Gi(x) is a increasing function, we have
0≪ G(0) ≤ · · · ≤ Gm(0) ≤ Gm(s(0)) ≤ · · · ≤ G(s(0)) ≤ s(0),
where Gm is the composition function of G for m times. By the monotone
criterion, we obtain
0≪ s := lim
m→+∞
Gm(0) ≤ s := lim
m→+∞
Gm(s(0)) ≤ s(0).
Due to the continuity of G, G(s) = s and G(s) = s. Therefore, we have
the following property [23].
Lemma 2.1. All the fixed points of G in the interval [0, s(0)] are contained
in [s, s].
Due to the continuous differentiability of G,
∂Gi(x)
∂xj
= βi
j − 1
j
P (j|i)
(
δ
γ + µ+ ξ
+ σ
1− δ
γa
)
Gi(x) (2.11)
for any x ∈ Rn and 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n. Moreover, we shall simply write (2.11) in
terms of the matrix form by
DG(x) :=
∂G(x)
∂x
= diag (G1(x), · · · , Gn(x))B,
where B = [bij ] and bij = βi
j−1
j
(
δ
γ+µ+ξ
+ σ 1−δ
γa
)
P (j|i).
By the monotony of G, DG is also monotonous, i.e., DG(x) ≤ DG(y) for
any 0 ≤ x ≤ y ≤ s(0). By utilizing the properties of w(x) and G(x), we can
obtain the following theorem.
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Theorem 2.1. Assume that the network is connected, we have
(1) w(0) = 0 if and only if G(s(0)) = s(0);
(2) when w(0) > 0, G has a unique fixed point s++ satisfying 0 ≪ s++ <
s(0).
The proof of Theorem 2.1 directly follows the proof in [23]. Hence, the
final size of susceptible individuals for a heterogeneous network, s(+∞), can
be determined by s++ to quantify the number of susceptible individuals left
theoretically.
3. Parameter estimation and model based forecasting
We parameterized the model with reported data on COVID-19 cases and
presented forecasts of the epidemic trends for the three areas.
3.1. Fitting reported confirmed cases
We simulated the spread of COVID-19 in Wuhan, Toronto, and Italy on
the Watts-Strogatz network with degree kmin = 1 and kmax = 10.
The study period for Wuhan starts from January 11, 2020, after the
confirmed cases were reported, the public becomes aware of the infection
and most people are trying to avoid gathering. The study period starts from
January 26 for Toronto and from January 31 for Italy. In Toronto and Italy,
usually people do not gather, especially after lockdown on Wuhan city, the
awareness of avoiding exposure to the virus is increasing. Most people stay
home during the study period, and the family sizes in Wuhan, Toronto, and
Italy on average are all around 3. Therefore, the range of the node degrees
is assumed to be between 1 and 10.
The Watts-Strogatz model starts with a ring of N vertices in which each
vertex is connected to its 2m nearest neighbors (m vertices clockwise and
m counterclockwise). Each edge is connected to a clockwise neighbor with
probability p and preserved with probability 1 − p [19], where the degree
distribution is
P (k) =
min(k−m,m)∑
n=0
(
m
n
)
(1− p)npm−n
(pm)k−m−n
(k −m− n)!
e−pm.
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When p→ 1, the expression reduces to a Poisson distribution as follows
P (k) =
mk−m
(k −m)!
e−m.
In the simulations, we used this degree distribution.
The total number of nodes for Wuhan, Toronto, and Italy are 11081000,
5928000, and 59430000 as shown in Table 1, Table 3, and Table 6, respec-
tively. We parameterized the model using the MCMC approach [24] by
MATLAB R2016a according to the number of newly confirmed cases and
the cumulative number of cases reported by the Health Commission of Hubei
Province [25] and WHO [26].
The rate at which the fraction of the cumulative number of cases changes
is dck/dt = ξik, where ck(t) represents the fraction of the cumulative number
of infected individuals with degree k. The number of newly infected can be
expressed as
Pk = [ck(t)− ck−1(t)]Nk,
where Pk represents the number of new cases with degree k, andNk represents
the total number of individuals with degree k. We run the MCMC simulation
for 20000 iterations to fit the value of Pk.
Zhou et al. showed that the median time from illness onset (i.e., before
admission) to discharge was 22 days (IQR 18-25), whereas the median time
to death was 18.5 days with IQR between 15 and 22 days [27]. We assume
an exponential distribution for the time to recovery for asymptomatically
infected individuals, symptomatically infected individuals, and hospitalized
individuals. This results in the recovery rates γa = γ = γh = 1/22 per
day, and the mortality rate, µ is 1/18.5 per day. The incubation period of
COVID-19 is around 7 days [4], resulting in the progression rate ǫ = 1/7. Qiu
et al. reported that around 30% − 60% of people infected with COVID-19
are asymptomatic or only have mild symptoms, and their transmissibility is
lower, but still significant [28]. Thus, we assume that the probability that an
infected individual is asymptomatic is 1−δ = 0.6, and σ = 1 for simulations.
We divided the Wuhan epidemic into four phases according to the re-
ported data [3]. The first phase is before lockdown on Jan 23, 2020. The
second phase is between Jan 24, 2020 and Feb 1, 2020 when the hospitals
were short of beds. The third phase is between Feb 2, 2020 and Feb 6, 2020
when the Thunder God Mountain Hospital (TGMH) and Fire God Mountain
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Hospital (FGMH) were put into use. The fourth phase began when door-
to-door screening was implemented on Feb 7, 2020 and TGMH, FGMH, and
Mobile Cabin Hospitals (MCH) were put into use.
The study period for Toronto (Canada) was decomposed into two phases,
namely, the period before Mar 18 and the period after Mar 18 when the city
announced the emergence and schools and universities in Toronto were closed
on Mar 18.
The study period for Italy was divided into two phases. The early epi-
demic phase was between Jan 31, 2020 and Mar 8, 2020 when the infection
was spreading through the northern provinces. The second period begins on
Mar 9, 2020 when the national lockdown started.
3.2. Predicting future epidemic trends
The parameters and initial conditions of simulations for Wuhan on the
WS network are shown in Table 1. The probability of transmission through
adequate contact is estimated by MCMC. The 5000 realizations of the basic
reproduction numbers derived for Wuhan using the parameter values listed
in Table 1 are shown in Table 2.
From Jan 11 to Mar 31, we estimate that the mean reproduction number
on the WS network decreases from 3.41 in the first phase to 5.34 × 10−3 in
the fourth phase. The epidemic on the WS network is shown in Figure 1.
Up to Jan 23, 2020 when Wuhan lockdown started, the estimated epidemic
size is 3.96×106. During the second stage, after the lockdown of Wuhan and
before the TGMH and FGMH were put into use, the predicted final size is
2.17× 106. Thus, the lockdown of Wuhan reduced the expected final size by
45.22%. During the third stage, after TGMH and FMGH were put into use,
the final size is 1.02×105. Hence, the city lockdown and the usage of TGMH
and FGMH reduced the final size by 97.42%. During the fourth stage, after
MCH was put into use, the predicted final size is 51269, and the expected
final size of infection is reduced by 98.70% due to the increase of healthcare
capacity.
The variability of the numbers of confirmed new cases is consistent with
the variability of the reproduction numbers listed in Table 2. In the first two
phases, the epidemic spread rapidly with larger reproduction numbers that
are larger than 1, and the numbers of infected cases increase. In the last two
phases, the spread of disease is controlled, and the reproduction numbers
are smaller than 1. In the third phase, because a large number of cases are
confirmed by door-to-door screening and expanded healthcare capacity, the
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cumulative number of confirmed cases increased. On the other hand, the
epidemic will die out because the reproduction number is less than one. In
the fourth phase, the spread of the disease has been under control with the
reproduction number being less than one. Hence, the number of new cases
decreases.
The parameters and initial conditions of simulations for the GTA are
shown in Table 3. The 5000 realizations of the basic reproduction numbers
derived for Toronto using the parameter values listed in Table 3 are shown in
Table 2. The reproduction numbers are much smaller due to social distancing
policy, school closure, as well as behavior changes. The summary of the
simulations is shown in Table 4 and Table 5. Simulation results are shown in
Figure 2. The peak size is 60.19 (95%CI: 47.42-72.97), the peak time is Apr
2 (95%CI: Mar 29-Apr 7), and the final size is 2712 (95%CI: 1603-3820).
The parameters and initial condition of simulations for Italy is shown in
Table 6. The 5000 realizations of the basic reproduction numbers derived
for Italy using the parameter values listed in Table 6 are shown in Table 2.
The reproduction numbers in the second phase are much smaller than that
in the first phase due to the awareness of the severity of the epidemic. The
summary of the simulation results is shown in Table 7 and Table 8. Figure
3 shows that the peak number of new cases is 5492 (95%CI: 5277-5708) on
Mar 26 (95%CI: Mar 24-Mar 27), and the final size is 2.59 × 105 (95%CI:
2.10× 105 − 3.08× 105).
4. The impact of mitigation strategies
The close contacts identified by contact tracing will be quarantined due
to exposure to COVID-19 to see if they become sick. To evaluate the impact
of mitigation strategies on the spread of COVID-19, Model (2.1) is rewritten
as follows
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

dsk
dt
= −βksk
∑
k′[1− (1−
k′−1
k′
P (k′|k)ik′)(1−
k′−1
k′
P (k′|k)σak′)]− qsk + λsqk,
dsqk
dt
= qsk − λsqk,
dek
dt
= βksk
∑
k′[1− (1−
k′−1
k′
P (k′|k)ik′)(1−
k′−1
k′
P (k′|k)σak′)]− ǫek,
dak
dt
= (1− δ)ǫek − γaak,
dik
dt
= δǫek − γik − µik − ξik,
dhk
dt
= ξik − γhhk − µhk,
drk
dt
= γik + γaak + γhhk,
ddk
dt
= µik + µhk,
(4.1)
where sqk = SQk/Nk represents the fraction of quarantined individuals with
degree k. The parameter q represents the rate at which susceptible individu-
als are quarantined, and λ represents the rate at which the quarantined and
uninfected close contacts transfer to the susceptible compartment again. In
the simulations, we let λ = 1/14 to approximate a mean time of 14 days in
the exposed state.
For Wuhan, the cumulative number of infected individuals after lockdown
and TGMH, FGMH, as well as MCH were put into use are shown in Figure 4.
The results show that the lockdown and the increase in healthcare capacity
are effective in controlling the numbers of confirmed cases.
For Toronto, the number of newly infected individuals and the cumula-
tive number of infected individuals produced on the WS network after imple-
menting additional containment strategies besides school closure are shown
in Figure 5. We simulated the scenarios of implementing various containment
strategies for Toronto. Simulation results showed that personal protection,
reducing the node degrees of symptomatically infected individuals, and quar-
antine of close contacts are effective in reducing the peak epidemic size and
final epidemic size. Reducing the transmission rate β, by x% also reduces R0
by x%. When β is reduced by 20% by personal protection or social distanc-
ing, the peak occurs one day earlier, and the final epidemic size is reduced by
around 18%. When β is reduced by 40%, the peak occurs two days earlier,
and the final epidemic size is reduced by around 33.3%. When q = 1/8,
the peak occurs four days earlier, and the final epidemic size is reduced by
45.21%. When q = 1/4, the peak appears five days earlier, and the final
epidemic size is reduced by 58.22%. When the node degrees of symptomati-
cally infected individuals are reduced by 1, 2, and 3, the number of new cases
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produced per day at the peak is reduced by 13.74%, 26.93%, and 39.18%.
The final epidemic size is reduced by 15.15%, 29.65%, and 43.55% when the
node degrees of symptomatically infected individuals are reduced by 1, 2,
and 3, respectively.
For Italy, the number of newly infected individuals and the cumulative
number of infected individuals simulated on the WS network after imple-
menting hypothetical containment strategies are shown in Figure 6. Various
scenarios of implementing mitigation strategies showed that the peak epi-
demic size and final epidemic size in Italy are greatly reduced by personal
protection, social distancing, behavior change of symptomatically infected
individuals, and quarantine. The simulations show that the peak would have
arrived earlier if the containment had been intensified.
When the probability of contact transmission coefficient β, is reduced by
20% by personal protection or social distancing, the peak occurs one day
earlier, and the final epidemic size is reduced by 21.56%. When β is reduced
by 41.44%, the peak occurs one day earlier, and the final epidemic size is
reduced by around 40%.
When q = 1/8, the peak occurs six days earlier, and the final epidemic size
is reduced by 52.87%. Yet, when q = 1/4, the peak occurs eight days earlier,
and the final epidemic size is reduced by 67.12%. When the node degree of
symptomatically infected individuals is reduced by 1, 2, and 3, the number of
new cases produced per day at the peak is reduced by 16.50%, 32.93%, and
49.11%, respectively. The final epidemic size is reduced by 17.90%, 34.70%,
and 50.51% when the node degrees of symptomatically infected individuals
are reduced by 1, 2, and 3, respectively.
5. Summary and Discussions
Modelling the dynamics of COVID-19 epidemics and assessment of miti-
gation strategies could be instrumental to public health agencies for surveil-
lance and healthcare planning. For the models to be reliable, the simulated
epidemic must account for the stochastic and heterogeneous contact among
individuals. Hence, we developed a network model that captured the con-
tact heterogeneity among individuals. We applied the model to analyze the
transmission potential, and mitigation strategies for curbing the spread of
COVID-19 epidemics in the cities of Wuhan, China and Toronto, Canada,
and in the Italian Republic. The epidemic threshold derived from our net-
work model can be used to predict the risks of spreading scenarios. We also
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provided an explicit expression of the final epidemic size, which facilitates
estimating the scale of an outbreak for any region of interest. Our results
provide insights in defining a mathematical framework for the analysis and
containment of epidemic transmission in the real world.
The flexible network model framework can simulate a wide range of mit-
igation strategies can be examined by the flexible model framework. It can
be extended to quantify the effectiveness of personal protection, social dis-
tancing, reducing the node degree of infected individuals, and quarantine on
the dynamics of epidemics in different regions. When the mitigation strategy
is intensified, the model predicts that the number of new cases peaks earlier
and the final epidemic size is greatly reduced.
The social contact network structure and parameter values determine the
transmission and epidemic course of such an emerging infectious disease. We
choose the Watts-Strogatz to approximate real social networks, when the
exact contact tracing data is unavailable. We assumed that the range of
the node degree is between one and ten for each network in the absence of
real contact tracing data, that is, on average each day an infected person
would have between one and ten contacts where they could transmit the
infection to another person. In the real world, the range of the degree will
depend on the distribution of the household sizes of the region and time being
studied. Moreover, the network structure can be altered by behavior change
of individuals during epidemics. When this happens, the network structure
can be adapted in our model to predict the impact of these changes on the
epidemic threshold, epidemic peak value, peak time, stopping time, and final
size of infected population.
The epidemics for the three places under study were fitted very well by
our model with a small confidence interval. Hence, the forecasts by the
model can be reliable. We did not provide the stopping time since too many
uncertainties may affect the duration of the epidemics. As shown in the
simulations, the transmission dynamics for four phases in Wuhan are quite
different due to the variability on the intensity of interventions, the avail-
ability of healthcare facilities, as well as the utilization of personal protective
equipment (PPE). The dynamics in the first phase is quite different from
that in the second phase for Toronto. The same phenomenon is observed in
Italy.
At the early stage, almost no interventions were implemented, and the
public was not aware of or did not pay much attention to the severity of
the highly contagious disease. With the increase of the number of reported
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confirmed cases and with the aid of social media, the public becomes aware of
the severe consequence and has increased the level of personal protection and
have avoided gathering, so that the reproduction number decreases and the
estimated epidemic size declines by reducing the node degree of the network.
Similarly, after applying the mitigation measures in Italy on March 8 and
closing all schools in Toronto on March 18, the epidemics tend to be under
control.
Hence, social distancing, self-isolation, quarantine, the utilization of PPE,
and other measures of avoiding exposure to the virus can greatly reduce the
size of infection during the COVID-19 outbreak. Therefore, it is essential
to raise the awareness of these countermeasures to avoid contact between
individuals. The possibility of recurrent outbreaks of the disease cannot be
overstated. Even if the number of new cases is declining, it is still necessary
to continue taking protective measures to prevent the occurrence of future
outbreaks. The social media should warn the public not to relax their vigi-
lance against the contagion of such a highly infectious disease.
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Table 1: The parameter values and initial condition of four-phase simulations
for Wuhan. Phase 1 is between Jan 11 and Jan 23, Phase 2 is between Jan 23 and Feb
1, Phase 3 is between Feb 1 and Feb 12, and Phase 4 is between Feb 12 and Mar 31.
Parameter Mean
value
Std 95% CI References
β (Phase 1) 0.04644 2.83×10−3 [0.0409, 0.0520] MCMC
β (Phase 2) 0.01597 4.79×10−3 [6.59×10−3, 0.0254] MCMC
β (Phase 3) 2.90×10−4 2.24×10−4 [0, 7.29× 10−4] MCMC
β (Phase 4) 7.30×10−5 7.27×10−5 [0, 2.16× 10−4] MCMC
ξ (Phase 1) 0.8550 0.1220 [0.6159, 1.0942] MCMC
ξ (Phase 2) 0.1499 0.1557 [0, 0.4552] MCMC
ξ (Phase 3) 0.3369 0.1089 [0.1234, 0.5504] MCMC
ξ (Phase 4) 0.8764 0.0836 [0.7124, 1.0403] MCMC∑
kNk(0) 11081000 − − [29]∑
k Sk(0) 11080770 − − Calculated∑
k Ek(0) 200.26 18.88 [163.25, 237.26] MCMC∑
k Ak(0) 17.81 4.13 [9.71, 25.90] MCMC∑
k Ik(0) 11.78 6.06 [0, 23.66] MCMC∑
kHk(0) 41 − − [25]∑
k Rk(0) 0 − − Estimated∑
kDk(0) 0 − − Estimated
Table 2: Basic reproduction numbers computed by MCMC on the WS network.
Location Period Mean
value
Standard
derivation
95% CI
Wuhan
Jan 11-Jan 23 3.4074 0.2099 [2.9959, 3.8188]
Jan 23-Feb 1 1.3065 0.3976 [0.5273, 2.0858]
Feb 1-Feb 12 0.0221 0.0170 [0, 0.0555]
Feb 12-Mar 31 5.35×10−3 5.34×10−3 [0, 0.0158]
Toronto
Jan 26-Mar 18 0.6416 0.0867 [0.4716, 0.8116]
Mar 18-Mar 29 0.0115 0.0151 [0, 0.0412]
Italy
Jan 31-Mar 8 1.4763 0.0984 [1.2834, 1.6691]
Mar 8- Mar 26 0.0359 0.0185 [0, 0.0721]
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Table 3: The parameter values and initial condition of simulations for Toronto.
Phase 1 is from Jan 26 to Mar 18, and Phase 2 is from Mar 18 to Mar 29.
Parameter Mean
value
Std 95% CI References
β (Phase 1) 7.95×10−3 1.12×10−3 [5.76× 10−3, 0.01] MCMC
β (Phase 2) 1.38×10−4 1.79×10−4 [0, 4.90× 10−4] MCMC
ξ (Phase 1) 0.1421 0.0734 [0, 0.2858] MCMC
ξ (Phase 2) 0.1140 0.0709 [0, 0.2530] MCMC∑
kNk(0) 5928000 - - [30]∑
k Sk(0) 5927990 - - Calculated∑
k Ek(0) 4.12 4.83 [0, 13.58] MCMC∑
k Ak(0) 2.43 2.22 [0, 6.78] MCMC∑
k Ik(0) 3.22 2.89 [0, 8.88] MCMC∑
kHk(0) 1 - - [26]∑
k Rk(0) 0 - - Estimated∑
kDk(0) 0 - - Estimated
Table 4: The peak number of new cases, peak time, and final epidemic size after
containment strategies are implemented in Toronto.
Scenarios Peak size (95%CI) Peak time (95%CI) Final size (95%CI)
β 60.19 (47.42, 72.97) Apr 2 (Mar 29, Apr 7) 2712 (1603, 3820)
0.8β 50.30 (41.03, 59.57) Apr 1 (Mar 28, Apr 6) 2217 (1451, 2984)
0.6β 40.94 (34.55, 47.32) Mar 31 (Mar 26, Apr 4) 1751 (1239, 2262)
q = 0 60.19 (47.42, 72.97) Apr 2 (Mar 29, Apr 7) 2712 (1603, 3820)
q = 1/8 44.66 (39.12, 50.21) Mar 28 (Mar 26, Mar 31) 1486 (1111, 1861)
q = 1/4 38.79 (33.86, 43.72) Mar 27 (Mar 25, Mar 29) 1133 (878, 1388)
Table 5: The peak number of new cases, peak time, and final epidemic size for
Toronto when varying node degrees of symptomatically infected individuals.
Degree Peak size (95%CI) Peak time (95%CI) Final size (95%CI)
k 60.19 (47.42, 72.97) Apr 2 (Mar 29, Apr 7) 2712 (1603, 3820)
k − 1 51.92 (42.08, 61.77) Apr 1 (Mar 28, Apr 6) 2301 (1476, 3125)
k − 2 43.98 (36.76, 51.20) Mar 31 (Mar 27, Apr 5) 1908 (1310, 2506)
k − 3 36.61 (30.96, 42.26) Mar 30 (Mar 25, Apr 3) 1531 (1114, 1949)
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Table 6: The parameter values and initial condition of simulations for Italy.
Phase 1 is between Jan 31 and Mar 8, and Phase 2 is between Mar 8 and Mar 26.
Parameter Mean value Standard
derivation
95% CI References
β (Phase 1) 0.0179 1.19× 10−3 [0.0156, 0.0203]] MCMC
β (Phase 2) 4.45× 10−4 2.30× 10−4 [0, 8.95× 10−4] MCMC
ξ (Phase 1) 0.0996 0.0458 [9.87 ×
10−3, 0.1894]
MCMC
ξ (Phase 2) 0.1312 0.0250 [0.0823, 0.1801] MCMC∑
kNk(0) 59430000 - - [31]∑
k Sk(0) 59429892 - - Calculated∑
k Ek(0) 69.01 56.92 [0, 180.58] MCMC∑
k Ak(0) 22.60 18.24 [0, 58.35] MCMC∑
k Ik(0) 32.11 24.23 [0, 79.59] MCMC∑
kHk(0) 2 - - [26]∑
k Rk(0) 0 - - Estimated∑
kDk(0) 0 - - Estimated
Table 7: The peak number of new cases, peak time, and final size after contain-
ment strategies are implemented in Italy.
Scenarios Peak size
(95%CI)
Peak time
(95%CI)
Final size (95%CI)
β 5492 (5277, 5708) Mar 26 (24, 27) 2.59×105(2.10×105, 3.09×105)
0.8β 4340 (4235, 4564) Mar 25 (24, 26) 2.03×105(1.75×105, 2.31×105)
0.6β 3323 (3197, 3450) Mar 25 (24, 26) 1.52×105(1.37×105, 1.66×105)
q = 0 5492 (5277, 5708) Mar 26 (24, 27) 2.59×105(2.10×105, 3.08×105)
q = 1/8 3413 (3279, 3547) Mar 20 (19, 21) 1.22×105(1.14×105, 1.30×105)
q = 1/4 2609 (2434, 2783) Mar 18 (17, 19) 8.51×104(7.91×104, 9.11×104)
Table 8: The peak size, peak time and final size for Italy when varying node
degrees of symptomatically infected individuals.
Degree Peak size
(95%CI)
Peak time
(95%CI)
Final size (95%CI)
k 5492 (5277, 5708) Mar 26 (24, 27) 2.59×105(2.10×105, 3.08×105)
k − 1 4583 (4410, 4755) Mar 25 (24, 27) 2.13×105(1.81×105, 2.44×105)
k − 2 3683 (3546, 3821) Mar 25 (24, 26) 1.69×105(1.50×105, 1.88×105)
k − 3 2795 (2680, 2910) Mar 24 (23, 26) 1.28×105(1.17×105, 1.39×105)
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Figure 1: Fitting the number of reported new cases and the cumulative number of reported
cases between Jan 11, 2020 and Mar 31, 2020 for Wuhan on Watts-Strogatz network.(A)
Fitting the number of reported new cases on the Watts-Strogatz network. (B) Fitting the
cumulative number of reported cases on the Watts-Strogatz network.
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Figure 2: Fitting the number of reported new cases and the cumulative number of reported
cases for Toronto on the Watts-Strogatz network. (A) Fitting the number of reported new
cases on the Watts-Strogatz network. (B) Fitting the cumulative number of reported cases
on the Watts-Strogatz network.
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Figure 3: Fitting the number of reported new cases and the cumulative number of reported
cases for Italy on the Watts-Strogatz network. (A) Fitting the number of reported new
cases on the Watts-Strogatz network. (B) Fitting the cumulative number of reported cases
on the Watts-Strogatz network.
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Figure 4: The impact of the variability on the healthcare capacity on the spread of the
epidemic in Wuhan on the Watts-Strogatz network.
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Figure 5: The impact of mitigation strategies on the spread of COVID-19 epidemic in
Toronto on the Watts-Strogatz network. In this figure and the following figure, the dashed
lines represent 95% confidence intervals. In (A) and (B), the red, purple, and green lines
represent that the transmission rates are unchanged, reduced by 20%, and reduced by
40%, respectively. In (C) and (D), the red, purple, and green lines represent the rate of
quarantine, q = 0, 1/8, and 1/4, respectively. In (E) and (F), the red, purple, and green,
and light blue lines represent that the node degrees of symptomatically infected individuals
are reduced by 0, 1, 2, and 3, respectively. (A) The number of newly infected individuals
after reducing the transmission rates by personal protection and social distancing. (B) The
cumulative number of infected individuals after reducing the transmission rates by personal
protection and social distancing. (C) The number of newly infected individuals after close
contacts are quarantined. (D) The cumulative number of infected individuals after close
contacts are quarantined. (E) The number of newly infected individuals after the node
degrees of symptomatically infected individuals are reduced. (F) The cumulative number
of infected individuals after the node degrees of symptomatically infected individuals are
reduced.
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Figure 6: The impact of mitigation strategies on the spread of COVID-19 epidemic in
Italy on the Watts-Strogatz network. (A) The number of newly infected individuals after
reducing the transmission rates by personal protection and social distancing. (B) The
cumulative number of infected individuals after reducing the transmission rates by personal
protection and social distancing. (C) The number of newly infected individuals after close
contacts are quarantined. (D) The cumulative number of infected individuals after close
contacts are quarantined. (E) The number of newly infected individuals after the node
degrees of symptomatically infected individuals are reduced. (F) The cumulative number
of infected individuals after the node degrees of symptomatically infected individuals are
reduced.
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